We present randomized algorithms to compute the sumset (Minkowski sum) of two integer sets, and to multiply two univariate integer polynomials given by sparse representations. Our algorithm for sumset has cost softly linear in the combined size of the inputs and output. This is used as part of our sparse multiplication algorithm, whose cost is softly linear in the combined size of the inputs, output, and the sumset of the supports of the inputs. As a subroutine, we present a new method for computing the coefficients of a sparse polynomial, given a set containing its support. Our multiplication algorithm extends to multivariate Laurent polynomials over finite fields and rational numbers. Our techniques are based on sparse interpolation algorithms and results from analytic number theory.
INTRODUCTION
Sparse polynomials are a fundamental object in computer algebra. Computer algebra programs including Maple, Mathematica, Sage, and Singular use a sparse representation by default for multivariate polynomials, and there has been considerable recent work on how to efficiently store and compute with sparse polynomials [8, 10, 19, 21, 14] .
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Much of the recent work on sparse arithmetic has focused on "somewhat dense" or structured cases, where the sparsity of the product is sub-quadratic [19, 21, 14] . At the same time, sparse interpolation algorithms, which in the fastest case can learn an unknown T -sparse polynomial from O(T ) evaluations, have gained renewed interest [7, 17, 6, 2] .
Most closely related to the current work, [15] recently presented algorithms to discover the coefficients of a sparse polynomial product, provided a list of the exponents and some preprocessing. In the context of pattern matching problems, [5] gave a Las Vegas algorithm to multiply sparse polynomials with nonnegative integer coefficients whose cost is O(T log 2 D).
A remaining question is whether output-sensitive sparse multiplication is possible in time comparable to that of dense multiplication. This paper answers that question, with three provisos: First, our complexity is proportional to the "structural sparsity" of the output that accounts for exponent collisions but not coefficient cancellations; second, our algorithms are randomized and may produce incorrect results with controllably low probability; and third, we ignore logarithmic factors in the size of the input.
To explain the first proviso, define for a polynomial F its support supp(F ) to be the set of exponents of nonzero terms in F . The sparsity of F , written #F , is exactly # supp(F ). For two polyomials F and G, we have # supp(F G) ≤ #F · #G. But in many cases the set of possible exponents poss(F, G) def = {eF + eG : eF ∈ supp(F ), eG ∈ supp(G)} is much smaller than #F · #G. This structural sparsity T = # poss(F, G), is an upper bound on the actual sparsity S = # supp(F G) of the product. Strict inequality S < T occurs only in the presence of coefficient cancellations. Part of our algorithm's cost depends only on the actual sparsity, and part depends on the potentially-larger structural sparsity.
Our algorithms have not yet been carefully implemented, and we do not claim that they would be faster than the excellent software of [10, 20] and others for a wide range of practical problems. However, this complexity improvement indicates that the barriers between sparse and dense arithmetic may be weaker than we once thought, and we hope our work will lead to practical improvements in the near future.
Our contributions
Our main algorithm is summarized in Theorem 1.1. Here and throughout, we rely on a version of "soft-oh" notation that also accounts for a bound µ on the probability of failure: Oµ(φ) def = O φ·polylog(φ/µ) , for any function φ, where polylog means log c for some fixed c > 0 [11, see sec. 25.7].
and µ ∈ (0, 1), Algorithm SparseMultZZ correctly computes the product H = F G with probability exceeding 1 − µ, using worstcase expected Oµ(S log C + T log D) bit operations, where S = # supp(F G) and T = # poss(F, G) are the actual and structural sparsity of the product, respectively.
Our algorithm relies on two subroutines, both of which are based on techniques from sparse interpolation and rely on number-theoretic results on the availability of primes.
The first subroutine Sumset(A, B) computes the sumset of two sets of integers A and B, defined as
This algorithm, which may be of independent interest, has softly-linear complexity in the size of the output A ⊕ B.
The second subroutine SparseMulCoeffs(F, G, S) requires a set containing supp(F G) in order to compute F G in time softly-linear in the input and output sizes. It is based on an algorithm in [15] , but is more efficient for large exponents.
The main steps of our multiplication algorithm are: 1. Use Sumset to compute poss(F, G).
2. Run SparseMulCoeffs with S = poss(F, G) but with smaller coefficients, to discover the true supp(F G). 3. Run SparseMulCoeffs again, with the smaller exponent set supp(F G) but with the full coefficients. Steps 1 and 2 work with a size-T exponent set but with small coefficients, and both contribute Oµ(T log D) to the overall bit complexity. Step 3 uses the size-S true support but with the full coefficients, and requires Oµ(S(log D + log C)) bit operations, for a total of Oµ(T log D + S log C).
Organization of the paper
Section 2 states our notational conventions and some standard results, and Section 3 contains the technical number theoretic results on which we base our randomizations.
Section 4 revisits and adapts our sparse interpolation algorithm from ISSAC 2014 that will be a subroutine for our sumset algorithm, presented in section 5.
Our new method to find the coefficients, once the support is known, is presented in Section 6. This is then used in concert with our sumset algorithm in Section 7 to describe fully the algorithm of Theorem 1.1, and also to explain how this can be easily extended to output-sensitive sparse multiplication over R[x ±1 1 , . . . , x ±1 n ], where R is Zm, Q, or GF(p e ).
BACKGROUND AND PRELIMINARIES
We count the cost of our algorithms in terms of bit complexity on a random-access machine. We state their costs using Oµ notation, meaning that our algorithms have a factor log c 1 µ in the running time. We can make c = 1 by running the entire algorithm with error bound 2 3 some O(log 1 µ ) times, then returning the most frequent result.
Our main algorithm depends on an unknown numbertheoretic constant, as discussed in Section 3. Thus we have proven only the existence of a Monte Carlo algorithm. We also discuss how this could be easily handled in practice.
Our randomized procedures return either the correct answer (with controllable probability 1 − µ), or an incorrect answer, or the symbol Fail. Whenever a subroutine returns Fail, we assume the calling procedure returns Fail as well.
Notation and representations
We let R denote a commutative ring with identity. For F ∈ R[x] we let F ⊂ R[x] denote the ideal generated by F . For n, m ∈ Z, m > 0, we let n rem m and n rem m denote the integers s ∈ [0, m) and t ∈ [−m/2, m/2) respectively, such that n ≡ s ≡ t (mod m). We write Zm for Z/mZ, typically represented as {n rem m|n ∈ Z}.
Unless otherwise stated we assume F ∈ R[x] is of the form
with coefficients ci ∈ R and exponents ei ∈ Z ≥0 . Often we assume each ci = 0 and the exponents are sorted e1 < · · · < eS, but it is sometimes useful to relax these conditions. We write S ≥ #F and D > deg F for the sparsity and degree bounds. When R = Z we write C > F ∞ def = maxi |ci| for the height of F . We also use the norm F 1 = i |ci|.
More generally, we consider multivariate Laurent poly-
In the case R = Z, the sparse representation of F consists of a tuple (n, C, D, S), followed by a list of S tuples (ci, (ei1, . . . , ein)), where each ci is stored using Θ(log C) bits and each eij is stored using Θ(log D) bits. The total size in this case is Θ(S log C + Sn log D). When R is instead a finite ring, C is omitted and each ci is stored using Θ(log |R|) bits.
When multiplying F, G ∈ Z[x], we assume shared bounds C and D so that total input/output size is
given that F G ∞ 1 < C 2 min(#F, #G). The dense representation of an n-variate polynomial F is an n-dimensional array of D n coefficients, where exponents are implicitly stored as array indices. In the case that R = Z with bound C as above, this requires Θ(D n log C) bits.
The terms "sparse polynomial" and "dense polynomial" refer only to the choice of representation, and not to the relative number of nonzero coefficients. Typically, we assume F is sparse and reserveF to indicate a dense polynomial. Converting between the sparse and dense representations has softly linear cost in the combined input/output size.
When computing a sumset A ⊕ B, we assume that every integer in A or B is represented using Θ(log D) bits, where D > max( A ∞ , B ∞ ).
Integer and polynomial arithmetic
We cite the following results from integer and polynomial arithmetic, which we use throughout. • m ± n, mn, m rem n, m rem n, for any m, n ∈ Z • Arithmetic in Zm for any m ∈ Z>0
• Arithmetic on dense polynomials in Zm[x]
• CRT: given integers (vi, mi), . . . ,
Procedure GetPrime(λ, µ)
Input: Integers S, D ∈ Z>0; γ ∈ (0, 1]; µ ∈ (0, 1). Output: Integer p, s.t. for any set S satisfying #S ≤ S and S ∞ < D, with probability at least 1 − µ, p is a γ-vanish-prime for S. (1) with bounds D, S, and C as described above. Our algorithm performs arithmetic on
, we reduce each exponent modulo p, and then add like-degree terms. By Fact 2.1, we have:
NUMBER-THEORETIC SUBROUTINES

Choosing primes
We first recall how to choose a random prime number. We test if p is prime in O(polylog(p)) time via the method in [1] . This test and Fact 3.1 lead to procedure GetPrime. Lemma 3.2. GetPrime(λ, µ) works as stated and has bit complexity Oµ(polylog(λ)).
Proof. The stated cost follows from fast primality testing due to [1] . The probability that any chosen p is prime is at least 6/(5 ln λ), from Fact 3.1. Therefore, using the fact that (1 − x) < exp(−x) for any nonzero x ∈ R, the probability that none of the chosen p are prime is at most 1 − 6 5 ln λ m < exp −6m 5 ln λ ≤ µ, as desired. It is frequently useful to choose a random prime that divides very few of the integers in some unknown finite set S ⊂ Z. If a fraction of γ integers in S do not vanish modulo p, then we call p a γ-vanish-prime for S. We call a 1-vanishprime for S a good vanish-prime. Procedure GetVanishPrime shows how to choose a random γ-vanish-prime. Procedure GetDiffPrime(S, D, γ, µ)
Input: Integers S, D ∈ Z>0; γ ∈ (0, 1]; µ ∈ (0, 1). Output: Integer p, s.t. for any set S satisfying #S ≤ S and diam(S) < D, with probability at least 1 − µ, p is a γ-difference-prime for S.
Proof. Let S be any subset of integers with #S ≤ S and S ∞ < D. Write M = a∈S |a| < D S , and write k for the number of "bad primes" for which more than (1 − γ)S elements of S vanish modulo p. Since each p ≥ λ, this means that
is an upper bound on the number of bad primes.
If 1 − γ is very small, we instead use a similar argument to say that the number of primes for which any element of S vanishes is at most k < S ln D/ ln λ.
Then Fact 3.1 guarantees the prevalence of bad primes among all primes in (λ, 2λ) is at most µ/2, so the probability of getting a bad prime, or of erroneously returning a composite p, is bounded by µ.
Avoiding collisions
A closely related problem is to choose p so that most integers in a finite set S are unique modulo p. We say that a ∈ S collides modulo p if there exists b ∈ S with a ≡ b (mod p). We say p is a γ-difference-prime for S if the fraction of integers in S which do not collide modulo p is at least γ. A 1-difference-prime is called a good difference-prime for S. Procedure GetDiffPrime shows how to compute differenceprimes, conditioned on the diameter of the unknown set S:
Lemma 3.4. Procedure GetDiffPrime has bit complexity polylog(p) and works as stated to produce a γ-differenceprime p satisfying p ∈ O(D) and
Proof. Let S be any set as described. An element a ∈ S collides modulo p iff the product of differences b∈S,b =a (a − b) vanishes modulo p. If p > D this can never happen. Otherwise, as each such product is at most diam(S) S−1 < D S−1 , the result follows from the Lemma 3.3, setting the D of the lemma to D S−1 .
Our algorithms often perform arithmetic modulo (x p − 1). Similar to the notion of collisions above for a set of integers modulo p, we say two distinct terms cx e and c x e of F ∈ R[x] collide modulo (x p − 1) if e ≡ e (mod p).
Essentially, reduction modulo (x p − 1) "hashes" exponent e ∈ supp(F ) to e rem p. If p is a good difference-prime for supp(F ) and q is a good vanish-prime for the coefficients of F , then F rem (x p − 1) with coefficients reduced modulo q has the same sparsity as F itself.
Primes in arithmetic progressions
Sometimes we implicitly reduce exponents modulo p by evaluating at pth roots of unity. In such cases we need to Procedure GetPrimRoots(D, T, C, µ)
is fixed but unspecified. Output: Prime p, primes (q1, . . . , q k ), and integers (ω1, . . . , ω k ); or Fail. construct primes q such that p|(q − 1), and to find pth roots of unity modulo each q.
In principle, this procedure is no different than the previous ones, as there is ample practical and theoretical evidence to suggest that the prevalence of primes in arithmetic progressions without common divisors is roughly the same as their prevalence over the integers in general.
However, the closest to Fact 3.1 that we can get here is as follows, which is a special case of Lemma 7 in [9] .
Lemma 3.5. There exists an absolute constant λ0 such that, for all λ ≥ λ0, and for all but at most λ/ ln 2 λ primes p in the range (λ, 2λ], there are at least λ 0.89 / ln λ primes q in the range (λ 1.89 , 2λ 1.89 ] such that p|(q − 1).
Proof. Set K = 0.53, which means (1.89) −1 < K < 17 32 . Fixing s = 1, and for any R ≥ 2, Lemma 7 in [9] guarantees the existence of positive constants αK and xK such that the following holds: For all x > max(xK , R 1/K ), and for all but R/ ln 2 R integers r ∈ (R, 2R], there are at least αK x/(ϕ(r) ln x) primes q in the range (x, 2x] such that r|(q − 1), where ϕ(r) is Euler's totient function.
Setting λ0 = max(xK , 3.78/αK ), and letting R = λ, r = p, and x = λ 1.89 , the statement of our lemma holds because
Lemma 3.5 forms the basis for Algorithm GetPrimRoots, where we assume that the constant λ0 is given. Since this constant has not actually been computed, a reasonable strategy would be to choose some small "guess" for λ0 and run the algorithm until it does not report failure. If the algorithm fails, it could be due to the random prime p being an "exception" in Lemma 3.5, or due to unlucky guesses for the primitive roots ζ, or due to the guessed constant λ0 being too small. Because our primality tests are deterministic, failure due to λ0 being too small is detectable by the algorithm returning Fail.
We state the running time and correctness, assuming λ0 is sufficiently large, as follows.
Lemma 3.6. Procedure GetPrimRoots has worst-case bit complexity Oµ (log C · polylog (T + log D)) . With probability at least 1 − µ, it returns a good difference-prime p for F , primes q1, . . . , q k such that i qi ≥ 2C, and pth primitive roots modulo each qi, ω1, . . . , ω k .
Proof. The lower bound λ ≥ max(786, 1.35 ln 3.13 (2C)) guarantees that there are sufficiently many even integers in the range [2, 2λ 0.89 ] in order for Step 6 to be valid, since for any λ ≥ 786, we have λ 0.89 > λ .32 ln 2 λ > 1.1 ln(2C) ln 2 λ.
For the running time, the outer loop does not affect the complexity in our notation because m ∈ O(log 1 µ ) ∈ Oµ (1) . Observe also that log λ ∈ polylog λ0 + T + log D + log C + 1 µ . The running time is dominated by the AKS primality tests in the inner loop, which are performed O(m log Cpolylog(λ)) times, each at cost O(polylog(λ)), giving the stated worstcase bit complexity.
All of the checks for primality of p and qi's, as well as the test that each ωi is a pth primitive root of unity modulo qi, are deterministic. Therefore the only possibility that the algorithm returns an incorrect result other than Fail is the probability that p is not a good difference-prime for supp(F ). According to the proof of Lemma 3.4, the condition λ > 20 3µ mT (T − 1) ln D, and using the union bound over all outer loop iterations, the probability that any of the chosen p's is not a good difference-prime is less than µ/2.
Consider next a single iteration of the outer loop. This will produce a valid output unless insufficiently many good qi's and ωi's are found for that choice of p.
From Fact 3.1 and Lemma 3.5, the probability that p is an exception to the lemma is at most 5/(3 ln λ), which is less than 1 4 from the bound λ ≥ 786. If p is not an exception, then Lemma 3.5 tells us that the probability of each q being prime is at least 1 ln λ . When q is prime, since prime p divides (q − 1), the probability that each ζ a is a p-PRU in Zq is (p−1)/p, easily making the total probability of successfully adding to Q and W at each loop iteration at least 0.99/(ln λ).
Let a ≥ 1.1 ln(2C) ln 2 λ be the size of A. By Hoeffding's inequality ( [13] , Thm. 1), the probability that fewer than 0.03a/(ln λ) integers are added to Q after all iterations of the inner loop is at most exp(−2a(0.96/ ln λ) 2 ) < exp(−2.02 ln(2C)) < 0.25, where the last inequality holds because C ≥ 1. Therefore, with probability at least 3 4 , and using again λ ≥ 786, at least 0.03a/ ln λ = 0.033 ln(2C) ln λ > ln(2C)/ ln λ integers are added to Q each time through the inner loop. Since each qi > λ, this means i qi > 2C, and the algorithm will return on Step 13.
Combining with the probability that p is an exception, we conclude that the probability the algorithm does not return in each iteration of the outer loop is at most 1/2. As this is repeated lg 2 µ times, the probability is less than µ/2 that the algorithm returns Fail. Using the union bound with the probability that any p is not a good difference-prime, we have the overall failure probability less than µ.
Procedure SparseInterpBB(F, G, α, r)
2 ) 2 Call procedure MajorityVoteSparseInterpolate from [3] , with coefficient field Zq, sparsity bound S, degree bound deg F + deg G, error bound µ 2 , and black box SparseInterpBB(F, G, ·, ·).
MULTIPLYING VIA INTERPOLATION
The subroutine Sumset computes poss(F, G) by first reducing the degrees and heights of the input polynomials and then multiplying them. However, it cannot perform the multiplication using a recursive call to SparseMultZZ because the degrees are never reduced small enough to allow the use of dense arithmetic in a base case.
Instead, we present here a "base case" algorithm which, given F , G, and a bound S ≥ #F + #G + #(F G), computes F G, in time softly linear in S, log C, and polylog(D). Any algorithm with such running time suffices; we will use our own from [3] , which is a Monte Carlo sparse interpolation algorithm for univariate polynomials over finite fields.
To adapt [3] for multiplication over Z[x], we first choose a "large prime" q > max(2C, 2D) and treat F, G and their product H = F G as polynomials over Fq. This size of q ensures that no extension fields are necessary. The subroutine SparseInterpBB specifies how the unknown polynomial H = F G ∈ Fq[x] will be provided to the algorithm. It exactly matches the sorts of black-box evaluations that [3] requires. The entire procedure is stated as BasecaseMultiply. Proof. In order to use SparseInterpBB in the algorithm from [3] , we simply replace the straight-line program evaluation on the first line of procedure ComputeImage with our procedure SparseInterpBB. Again, note that as the prime q was chosen with q > 2D, the MajorityVoteSparseInterpolate algorithm does not need to work over any extension fields.
The correctness is guaranteed by the previous lemma, as well as Theorem 1.1 in [3] . For the bit complexity, in Section 7 of [3] , we see that the cost is dominated by Oµ(log D) calls to the black box evaluation function, each of which is supplied q ∈ O(C + D), and r ∈ Oµ(S log D). Applying the bit complexity of Lemma 4.1 gives the stated result.
SUMSET ALGORITHM
Let A, B ∈ Z ∩ (−D, D) be nonempty, R = #A + #B, and S = #(A ⊕ B) throughout this section. We prove as follows:
Theorem 5.1. Procedure Sumset(A, B, µ) has bit complexity Oµ(S log D) and produces A ⊕ B with probability at least 1 − µ.
We compute the sumset A ⊕ B as supp(H),
Here H has exponents in (−2D, 2D) and H ∞ < R. Thus it suffices to construct the exponents of H modulo ≥ 4D. Moreover, we have supp(H) = poss(F, G), and that
(3)
Estimating sumset output size
We first show how to compute a tighter upper bound on the true value of S = #H = #(A ⊕ B). To this end, let p ∈ O(D) be a good difference-prime for supp(H), using the naive bound R 2 from (3), and define the H1 = F1G1, where F1, G1 ∈ Z[x] are defined by
Then deg H1 < 2p and each term cx e of H corresponds to either one or two terms in H1, of degrees e rem p and (e rem p) + p. Therefore #H1/2 ≤ #H = S ≤ #H1.
We will compute an approximation S * ≈ S such that S * /2 < #H1 ≤ S * , and therefore S * /4 < S ≤ S * . To this end we present a test that, given S * , always accepts if #H1 ≤ S * and probably rejects if #H1 > 2S * . We do this for S * initially 2, doubling whenever the test rejects.
Given the current estimate S * , we next choose a (1/2)difference-prime q for the support of any 2S * -sparse polynomial with degree 2p > deg H1, and compute H * = H1 mod (x q − 1). We work modulo m = R 2 > H 1 ≥ H * ∞, such that none of the coefficients of H * vanish modulo m. If H1 is S * -sparse then H * is as well. If H1 has 2S * terms then, as fewer than S * terms of H1 are in collisions, H * is not S * -sparse. As no terms of H1 vanish modulo m, additional terms in H1 can only increase #H * .
We choose q so that the test is correct with probability at least 3/4. By iterating 8 ln(8/µ) times, by Hoeffding's inequality, the probability is at least 1 − µ/4 that the test runs correctly in at least half of the iterations. As #H1 < 2R 2 , it suffices that the test is correct log 2 R + 1 times.
The Sumset procedure performs this test on lines 3-7. By Corollary 2.2 the respective costs of constructing F * and F * mod (R 2 , x q − 1) are Oµ(R log D) and Oµ(R log p log R), and similarly for G * . The cost of the dense arithmetic here is Oµ(q log R). Given that p ∈ Oµ(D), q ∈ Oµ(S log p), the total bit-cost of this part is Oµ(S log D).
Computing sumset
Armed with the bound S * /4 < S ≤ S * , we aim to compute H = F G. Our approach is to compute images H1 = F1G1 mod ( 2 , x p − 1),
for an integer = 8D ≥ max(deg H, H 1 ).
Since the coefficients of H2 are scaled by powers of ( + 1), a single term cx e in the original polynomial H becomes cx e rem p in H1 and c( + 1) e x e rem p in H2, and if they are uncollided we can discover ( + 1) e by computing their quotient. Modulo 2 , this quotient ( + 1) e is simply e + 1, from which we can obtain the exponent e. This idea is similar to the "coefficient ratios" technique suggested by [16] , but working modulo 2 allows us to avoid costly discrete logarithms. Procedure Sumset contains the complete description.
Procedure Sumset(A, B, µ) Input: A, B ⊆ Z with #A + #B = R and max k∈A∪B |k| < D; µ ∈ (0, 1). Add (c /c − 1)/ to S 18 else return Fail //cannot reconstruct an exponent 19 return S Sumset has four steps that are probabilistic: choosing a good difference-prime p, estimating the sumset size S = #(A ⊕ B), and constructing H1 and H2. As each is set to fail with probability less than µ/4, Sumset succeeds with probability at least 1 − µ.
We now analyze the total cost of this algorithm. GetD-iffPrime produces p of size log p < polylog(R + log D + 1 µ ). Constructing F1, F2, G1, G2 at the beginning, and the reduction of H1, H2 modulo ( 2 , x p − 1) at the end, both cost Oµ(S log D) bit operations.
The search for S * costs Oµ(S log D) from the previous section. Finally, as F1 ∞ < /2, deg F1 < p, and similarly for F2, G1, and G2, the sparse multiplications due to Base-caseMultiply also costs Oµ(S log D) bit operations. These dominate the complexity as stated in Theorem 5.1.
MULTIPLICATION WITH SUPPORT
We turn now to the problem of multiplying sparse F, G ∈ Z[x], provided some S ⊇ supp(F G). This algorithm is used twice in our overall multiplication algorithm: first with large S = poss(F, G) but small coefficients, then with the actual support S = supp(F G) but full-size coefficients. Theorem 6.1. Given F, G ∈ Z[x] and a set S ⊂ Z ≥0 such that supp(F G) ⊆ S, the product F G can be computed in time Oµ ((#F + #G + #S) (log C + log D)) , where C = F ∞ + G ∞ and D > deg F + deg G. This is Oµ-optimal, as it matches the bit-size of the inputs. Our algorithm requires a small randomly-selected good difference-prime p with O(log S + log log D) bits, and a series of pairs (q, ω), where each q is a slightly larger prime with O(log p) bits, and ω is an order-p element in Zq. These numbers are provided by GetPrimRoots (Sec. 3). Our algorithm works by first reducing the exponents modulo p, then repeatedly reducing the coefficients modulo q and performing evaluation and interpolation at powers of ω. This inner loop follows exactly the algorithm of [15] and [18] for applying a transposed Vandermonde matrix and its inverse. Since p is a good difference-prime for the support of the product, there are no collisions and this gives us each coefficient modulo q. The process is then repeated O(log C) times in order to recover the full coefficients via Chinese remaindering.
Comparison to prior work
Without affecting the complexity, we may assume that S contains the support of the inputs too, i.e., supp(F ) and supp(G). We also assume that max S = deg F G, such that no e ∈ S is too large to be an exponent of F G. Under these assumptions, and writing S = #S, the stated complexity of our algorithm is simply Oµ(S(log C + log D)).
The problem of computing the coefficients of a sparse product, once the exponents of the product are given, has been recently and extensively investigated by van der Hoeven and Lecerf, where they present an algorithm whose bit complexity (in our notation) is Oµ e∈S log e (log D + log C) ([15], Corollary 5). As e∈S log e ∈ O(S log D), the algorithm here saves a factor of at most O(log D) in comparison, which could be substantial if the exponents are very large.
Their algorithm is more efficient if the support superset S is fixed, in which case they can move the most expensive parts into precomputation and compute the result in the same soft-oh time as our approach, Oµ(S(log D + log C)). Furthermore, the support bit-length e∈S log e is at most O(S log D), but could be as small as Ω(S log S + log D), for example if the support contains only a single large exponent. In such cases our savings is only on the order of (log D)/S.
Transposed Vandermonde systems
Applying transposed Vandermonde systems, and their inverses, is an important subroutine in sparse interpolation algorithms, and efficient algorithms are discussed in detail by [18] and [15] . We restate the general idea here and refer the reader to those papers for more details.
IfF is a dense polynomial, it is well known that applying the Vandermonde matrix V (θ1, . . . , θD) to a vector of coefficients fromF corresponds to evaluatingF at the points θ1 . . . , θD. Applying the inverse Vandermonde matrix corresponds to interpolatingF from its evaluations at those points. The product tree method can perform both of these using O(D) field operations ( [11] , Chapter 10).
If F is instead a sparse polynomial F = e∈S c1x e , evaluating F at consecutive powers of a single high-order element ω corresponds to multiplication with the transposed Vandermonde matrix:
The transposition principle tells us it is possible to compute the maps V T and (V T ) −1 in essentially the same time as dense evaluation and interpolation. In particular, if the coefficients ci are in the modular ring Zq, then the transposed Vandermonde map and its inverse can be computed using O(S log q) bit operations [15] . implicitly defined as F = 1≤i≤S fix e i and G = 1≤i≤S gix e i ; error bound µ ∈ (0, 1). Output: (h1, . . . , hS) ∈ Z S such that, with probability least 1 − µ, F G = 1≤i≤S hix e i . Oµ e∈S log e + S log C . Proof. We first analyze the probability of failure when S ⊇ supp(F G). The randomization is in the choices of p, q, and ω; problems can occur if these lack the required properties.
Statement and analysis of the algorithm
If p is a good difference-prime for supp(F G), then by definition there will be no collisions in Sp. Furthermore, if ω is a pth root of unity modulo q, then there are no collisions among the values (v1, . . . , vS), so V (v1, . . . , vS) is invertible modulo q. Algorithm GetPrimRoots ensures this is the case with high probability, and if so the algorithm here faithfully computes each coefficient hi modulo q.
Procedure SparseMultZZ(F, G)
Conversely, if there are no collisions in Sp, and if no zero divisors modulo q are encountered in the application of the Vandermonde matrix and its inverse, then the algorithm correctly computes then values hi mod q, even if p is not prime or some ω ∈ Zq is not actually a pth root of unity.
Therefore all failures in choosing tuples p, q, ω are either detected by the algorithm or do not affect its correctness. Since that is the only randomized step, we conclude that the entire algorithm is correct whenever the input exponent set S contains the support of the product.
For the complexity analysis first define D = deg(F G).
Step 2 costs Oµ(log C · polylog(S + log D)) bit operations by Lemma 3.6. Reducing each exponent ei modulo p, on step 3, can be done for a total of Oµ( e∈S log e) bit operations. Now we examine the cost of the for loop that begins on step 5. As the exponents are now all less than p, computing each vi on step 7 requires only O(log p) operations modulo q, for a total of O(S log p log q), which is Oµ(S · polylog(log C + log D)) bit operations. From before we know that applying the transposed Vandermonde matrix and its inverse takes Oµ(S log q), or Oµ(S · polylog(log C + log D)) bit operations.
Because #Q ≤ log p (2C) , the loop on step 5 repeats O(log C) times, for a total cost of Oµ(S log C·polylog(log D)) bit operations. This also bounds the cost of the Chinese remaindering in the final loop.
MULTIPLICATION ALGORITHMS
The complete multiplication algorithm over Z[x] that was outlined in the introduction is presented as SparseMultZZ.
Proof of Thm. 1.1. Unless failure occurs, we have S1 = poss(F, G). Every coefficient in H is a sum of products of coefficients in F and G, so the value CH computed on step 2 is an upper bound on H ∞ , and p is a good vanish-prime for H. Thus S2 = supp(H rem p) = supp(H), so the final step correctly computes the product F G.
By the union bound, Lemma 3.3, and Theorems 5.1 and 6.1, the probability of failure is less than µ.
Writing T = # poss(F, G) and S = # supp(F G), we see that log p ≤ polylog(T + log C + 1 µ ), thus steps 1 and 4 contribute Oµ(T log D) to the overall cost, whereas the last step costs Oµ(S(log D + log C)) bit operations. As S ≤ T , the total bit complexity is Oµ(T log D + S log C), as required.
We now consider extensions of this algorithm to positive and negative exponents (Laurent polynomials), multiple variables, and other common coefficient rings, using Kronecker substitution. This is stated in the following theorem.
1 , . . . , x ±1 n ] be sparse Laurent polynomials over R, where R = Z, Zm, GF(q e ), or Q.
The product F G can be computed using Oµ(T (n log D + B)) bit operations, where T = # poss(F, G) is the structural sparsity of the product, D > maxi | deg i (F G)|, and B is the largest bit-length of any coefficient in the input or output.
Proof. Write the output polynomial H = F G as
where each ci ∈ R and each eij satisfies |eij| < D.
We first apply the Kronecker substitution, providing an easily-invertible map between R[x ±1 1 , . . . , x ±1 n ] and R[z ±1 ]: xi → z D i−1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. This increases the degree to D n , such that the logarithm of this degree is O(n log D), matching the exponent bit-size in the multivariate representation.
The algorithm Sumset already handles negative exponents (i.e., Laurent polynomials) explicitly. The other primary subroutine to SparseMultZZ is SparseMulCoeffs, which only uses the exponents in the set Sp, which are reduced modulo p and therefore cause no difficulty if they are negative. Thus the multiplication algorithms handle univariate Laurent polynomials without any changes.
To extend the multiplication algorithm and its subroutines beyond R = Z, we use that our algorithm is also softly-linear in the input heights. This allows us to adapt to any coefficient domain that provides a natural mapping to the integers, and to preserve softly-linear time if that mapping provides only a softly-linear increase in size.
For a modular ring R = Zm, we can trivially treat the inputs as actual integers, then reduce modulo m after multiplying. For a finite field R = GF(p d ), elements are typically represented as polynomials over Zp[z] modulo a degree-d irreducible polynomial, so these coefficients can be converted to integers using a low-degree Kronecker substitution. For the rationals R = Q, we might choose a prime q larger than the product of the largest numerator and denominator in the output, multiply modulo q, then use rational reconstruction to recover the actual coefficients.
In all the above cases, there is growth in the bit-length of coefficients, but only in poly-logarithmic terms of input and output size, therefore not affecting the soft-oh complexity. The only downside is that we are no longer able to split the cost neatly between T = poss(F, G) and S = supp(F G) because the unreduced integer polynomial product might have nonzero coefficients which are really zeros in R.
